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Abstract
Primitive ontology is a program which seeks to make explicit the ontologi-
cal commitments of physical theories in terms of a distribution of matter in or-
dinary space-time. This program targets wave-function realism, which interprets
the high-dimensional configuration space on which wave-functions are defined as
our fundamental physical space. Wave-function realism allegedly fails to account
for a correspondence between the ontology it postulates and the ‘manifest im-
age’ of the world in which experimental tests of the theory are performed, and
therefore the wave-function must be completed with an additional structure which
describes what fundamentally exists in ordinary space-time: the ‘primitive ontol-
ogy’. However primitive ontologies face some difficulties, in particular concerning
the ontological status of the wave-function. In this paper, I defend a realist inter-
pretation of the wave-function as describing objects in ordinary space-time, which
does not require supplementing the theory with additional structure. The main dif-
ference between this proposal and other primitive ontology proposals is that the
fundamental constituents of reality are not conceived of as localised objects, but
as primitive relations. This interpretation purports to share the advantages of both
wave-function realism and primitive ontologies without facing the same difficul-
ties. I argue that the need for an additional structure stems from a commitment to
the locality of the fundamental constituents of reality, and that such commitment
is unnecessary for recovering the manifest image of the world.
Primitive ontology has been proposed as a requirement for proper realist interpre-
tations of physical theories. The requirement goes along these lines: physical theories
should tell us precisely what exists in the world, in terms of distribution of matter
in space-time, or ‘local beables’ (Allori et al. 2008, Bell 2004). It is claimed that
such commitments are necessary to make intelligible the correspondence between the-
ory and experience, or between the ‘scientific image’ and the ‘manifest image’ of the
world.
Experimental tests of our physical theories are usually performed in laboratories,
with the help of measuring apparatus that we perceive as ordinary objects with deter-
minate, macroscopic properties localised in our familiar 3 + 1 dimensional space-time
(or our 3 dimensional space evolving with time). These measuring apparatus are part
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of the ‘manifest image of the world’. It is reasonable to assume that a realist interpre-
tation of a physical theory should make explicit how this ‘manifest image’ is recovered
from the theory, in pain of undermining its own experimental basis. One should be
able to map the real entities posited by the theory to ordinary objects in space-time,
and this requires that the interpretation of the theory provides a primitive ontology of
fundamental objects located in space-time, to which properties might be attributed, and
of which ordinary objects, including measuring apparatus, are constituted. Arguably, a
theory that does not fulfil this standard could be deemed incomplete.
Newtonian mechanics or classical electromagnetism are quite easy to interpret as
theories that attribute properties to localised objects: physical models are typically
viewed as attributing charges, masses and velocities to particles, and the electromag-
netic field can be viewed as attributing more complex properties, represented by vec-
tors, to the space-time points themselves. Special and general relativity also fulfil this
standard, even though the geometry of space-time involved is different from that of
classical physics (and, in the case of general relativity, not independent of the physical
properties themselves). Quantum theory, however, does not come equipped with such
a primitive ontology in ordinary space-time that could be directly read off the models.
According to standard quantum mechanics, the wave-function of the universe is not
a field on our familiar 3 dimensional space, but on an abstract, 3N dimensional con-
figuration space, where N is the number of particles in the universe. (This aspect is
directly related to the notion of entanglement: a system of N particles is not generally
reducible to the combination of N independent systems.)
From a realist perspective, what then could be the ontology of quantum theory?
Two options are usually considered in the literature. The first one, dubbed ‘wave-
function realism’, consists in biting the bullet and assume that the fundamental objects
or properties quantum theory is about do not live in a 3 dimensional physical space,
but in the 3N dimensional configuration space. Our familiar space would somehow
emerge from this high dimensional space and from the dynamical aspects of the the-
ory. However many authors doubt the viability of this solution. They suggest a second
option, which consists in completing the formalism of the theory with additional struc-
tures in a 3 dimensional space that would play the role of the primitive ontology, i.e.
of what exists in space-time at the fundamental level, and that would therefore fill the
gap between the theory and the manifest image of the world. Proposals so far include
matter density fields, particles or flashes.
The aim of this paper is to evaluate the primitive ontology program. I will argue
that even though some of the worries raised by wave-function realism are well founded,
one needs not complement the wave-function with additional structures to fulfil the
desirata of primitive ontology proponents. One only needs to properly interpret the
wave-function as an object living in ordinary space-time. As a demonstration of this
claim, I will propose such an interpretation and show how the manifest image of the
world can be recovered from it.
2
In section 1, the concept of primitive ontology and its motivations are introduced.
Its difficulties are briefly reviewed. Section 2 is devoted to a realist interpretation of the
wave-function in ordinary space-time, which demonstrates that no additional structure
is required to fulfil the desirata of the primitive ontology program. Section 3 highlights
the advantages of this alternative over other primitive ontology proposals. Possible
objections are addressed. In conclusion, I will argue that the difficulties of the primitive
ontology program and of wave-function realism stem from a prejudice against holism.
1 The Primitive Ontology Program
In standard, non-relativistic quantum mechanics, the wave-function of a system can
be represented either as a vector in Hilbert space or as a complex field on a config-
uration space of 3N dimensions, where N is the number of particles of the system.
Both representations are on a par, but the latter is viewed by wave-function realists as
ontologically more significant (Albert 1996) in particular because it pictures the world
as constituted of bearers (the configuration space points) of properties (the complex
numbers), rather than just a single vector in a structured space.
The configuration space is a concept which finds its origin in classical physics,
where each of its dimensions represents a degree of freedom of the system. If a com-
posite system has N particles and each particle has 3 degrees of freedom (for example
the three spatial coordinates of its position), then the whole system has 3N degrees of
freedom. The state of a composite system can be represented either as a single point or
as a probability distribution on configuration space (see figures 1 and 2 for illustrations
of the configuration space of a composite system of two particles with only one degree
of freedom each, e.g. their position along an axis). The high number of dimensions
of the configuration space is simply a combinatorial effect due to the high number of
particles in the system, and this space is generally interpreted as a mathematical tool
rather than as a physical space. In any case one is free to return to a more intuitive
representation of the system in ordinary space-time.
Figure 1: Illustration of the state of a composite system of two particles with one degree
of freedom each
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Figure 2: Illustration of a probability distribution for a composite system of two parti-
cles with one degree of freedom each
In quantum mechanics, systems are represented by a complex valued field on a
configuration space: the wave-function. However in this case, it is often assumed
that interpreting the configuration space as a mere mathematical tool is not possible,
because the wave-function of a composite system is not generally reducible to a set of
independent fields on ordinary space (in particular when the system is entangled. See
figure 3).
Figure 3: Illustration of a wave-function for a composite system of two particles with
one degree of freedom each
If the wave-function represents all that exists, then, according to wave-function
realists, our real physical space must be the configuration space. Without particles
or other objects in ordinary space, the notion of configuration is no more intelligible:
there is nothing to be configured, so the 3N dimensional configuration space must be
the fundamental physical space we live in and ordinary space must be either emergent
or illusory.
However wave-function realists must tell us how exactly objects in a 3-dimensional
space, or the appearence thereof, would arise from the arrangement of objects in a
3N dimensional space. Albert proposes that the dynamic explains the appearence of
familiar objects, but the prospects of reducing the three dimensionality of these objects
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to dynamical aspects rather than to the fact that their fundamental constituents already
live in ordinary space-time is still controversial. Some authors argue that we have no
theoretical resources at our disposal to map the dimensions of the configuration space
onto three identifiable spatial dimensions in a non-ad-hoc way, and that something is
missing in our ontology to recover our familiar 3D objects (see Monton (2002), Lewis
(2004), Monton (2006), Ney & Albert (2013)).
This argument motivates the primitive ontology program, which seeks to comple-
ment standard quantum mechanics with an additional structure which would represent
what ‘really exists’ in ordinary space-time at the fundamental level. The program in-
cludes three mature proposals: Bohmian mechanics, GRWm and GRWf, where the
primitive ontology is constituted of respectively particles, matter density fields and
bare instantaneous events, a.k.a. ‘flashes’.
Note that the requirement for our theories to provide an ontology in ordinary space-
time is distinct from the measurement problem in quantum mechanics. The latter is
the problem of explaining the determinacy of measurement outcomes, whereas wave-
functions generally do not assign determinate properties to the systems they describe.
Realist solutions to the measurement problem involve either completing the structure of
the theory with additional variables (e.g. position of particles in Bohmian mechanics),
with an additional dynamic (spontaneous localisation in GRW and CSL) or denying
that measurement outcomes are objectively determinate after all (many-world inter-
pretation). However once the measurement problem is solved, the problem we are
concerned with might remain. In particular, although Bohmian mechanics provides
an ontology of particles, GRW, CSL and many-world theories do not provide an on-
tology for quantum mechanics apart from the wave-function, and it remains unclear,
according to these theories, what exactly exists in ordinary space-time. Conversely,
providing an ontology in ordinary space-time for quantum mechanics solves the mea-
surement problem out of hand, in so far as the locality of the primitive ontology can
ground the determinacy of measurement outcomes (assuming, following Bell, that all
measurements reduce to position measurements). Thus the metaphysical problem that
primitive ontologies aim to solve can be viewed as a stronger version of the measure-
ment problem.
The program is not devoid of difficulties. There are difficulties in elaborating quan-
tum relativistic versions of these new theories, but the main difficulties concern status
of the wave-function. The wave-function cannot be dispensed with, for it does all the
predictive job, so to speak, but its ontological status remains unclear (Belot 2012).
If the wave-function is accepted as an object of our ontology, on a par with the ad-
ditional structure, then the primitive ontology seems derivative rather than truly ‘prim-
itive’, and it seems that it could be reduced. In the case of GRWf and GRWm, the
primitive ontology is deduced from the wave-function and laws, and although mathe-
matical dependence does not always imply ontological dependence, the primitive on-
tology might seem superfluous in these particular cases. Furthermore, having causal
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relations between objects living in different spaces, one of which is a still mysterious
high-dimensional space, is arguably not a very satisfying option (Egg & Esfeld 2015).
For these reasons, most authors fall back on a construal of the wave-function as a
nomic entity. The wave-function would be a dynamical parameter figuring in a phys-
ical theory to describe the evolution of the primitive ontology. From this perspective,
several metaphysical interpretations are possible. They correspond to the main meta-
physical interpretations of the nomic aspects of theories in general: governing laws of
nature, humeanism or dispositionalism.
Conceiving of the wave-function as a law seems hardly intelligible, since laws of
nature are generally taken to apply in all places and times. But wave-functions can vary
in space and time. Furthermore, assuming that physicists are actually measuring ‘laws’
when, say, they prepare a system in a superposition of state seems rather unintuitive.
In addition, it is legitimate to wonder if we are not merely sweeping under the rug
of ‘laws’ all the interpretational difficulties associated with the wave-function’s multi-
dimensional space.
One could have a humean conception of laws, whereby laws are part of the ‘best
system’, i.e. the best description of the distribution of the primitive ontology in terms
of simplicity and informativeness. Following this view, laws do not govern matter, but
supervene on it. Humeanism is problematic at least for some of the primitive ontology
proposals, such as GRWm, where the quantum state does not supervene on the distri-
bution of the primitive ontology (Egg & Esfeld 2015). In any case there are objections
against humeanism in general (Carroll 2008) (although some standard objections, such
as objections from quidditism or humility, do not apply here (Esfeld 2014)).
The last option consists in assuming that the wave-function represents the disposi-
tional properties of matter (Egg & Esfeld 2015). However Egg & Esfeld observe that
these dispositions cannot be assigned to the individual parts of the primitive ontology
(the local beables) directly. They have to be assigned to local-beable configurations
instead. Ultimately under this view, the wave-function of the universe is just the dispo-
sitional structure of the whole universe. The difference between attributing a disposi-
tional structure, or a state, is slim and it is not clear that we have made much progress
so far.
Recall that the aim of primitive ontologies is to reconcile the scientific and the
manifest image of the world. A central aspect of the manifest image of the world is
that objects have localised properties. Arguably, some of (if not all) these properties
are dispositional and one should be able to explain why ordinary, localised objects have
localised dispositions. If all that exists is a disposition of the whole universe to evolve,
then the account fails on this respect and the explanatory gap remains (see Dorato
(2015) for related arguments).
Another concern one can have with the primitive ontology program is methodolog-
ical. The program seeks to complement our theories with an ad-hoc mathematical
structure for metaphysical purposes only. The primitive ontologies are thus inert, in
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the sense that they play no predictive role. They rather play an explanatory role as
bearers, in ordinary space-time, of the nomic aspects of the theory. Albert (2015) notes
that this contradicts our common intuitions regarding the causal role played by the fun-
damental constituents of reality and in any case, from this lack of predictive role, an
underdetermination by experiment ensues.
This could raise some suspicions: aren’t we merely trying to fit the theory into
the mould of our pre-theoretical intuitions? After all, physicists do not seem to have
much difficulties in making a connection between models and experiments (at least
once a solution to the measurement problem is assumed). They do not postulate addi-
tional structures beyond those of the textbooks for that purpose. It seems reasonable
to assume that the theory already has all the resources needed to relate to our famil-
iar space-time. Shouldn’t metaphysics be content with providing good metaphysical
interpretations of the predictive, theoretical structure the physicists postulate for their
empirical needs? Do we really need to build some formal machinery to cure our meta-
physical worries? One could interpret the primitive ontology program as an attempt
to domesticate science with metaphysics (Ross et al. 2007) and be sceptical about the
whole approach. As Ross et al. argue, our pre-theoretical intuitions, such as the com-
mon idea that all physical objects are constituted of localised parts, are adapted to our
familiar environment but nothing indicates that they are still relevant when applied to
remote domains of experience. Our common intuitions might not be good guides to
address the fundamental nature of the physical world, and modifying or completing
our scientific theories on their behalf might not be the best strategy.
Personally I tend to share this scepticism, and while I agree that physics should tell
us explicitly what exists in ordinary space-time, it seems to me that the primitive ontol-
ogy program and wave-function realism both share the unwarranted assumption that an
interpretation of the wave-function in ordinary space-time is not available. Rather than
arguing furthermore, I would like to give a positive account of how the wave-function
can be interpreted as representing objects living in ordinary space-time. If it works,
then an alternative exists to the primitive ontology program and to wave-function real-
ism which does not face the difficulties of both approaches.
2 An alternative to primitive ontologies
2.1 Interpreting the configuration space
Both the primitive ontology defenders and the wave-function realists implicitly assume
that the wave-function alone cannot represent objects living in ordinary space-time,
because the wave-function is a field on configuration space. However there are some
reasons to think that the configuration space derives from ordinary space rather than the
converse. First, the concept of configuration space originates in classical physics, and
one could expect a certain continuity in the way it is interpreted and connected with
experience. Second, it should be noted that quantum field theory assumes a relativistic
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space-time as a background, and that configuration spaces associated with bounded
regions of space-time are derived from this background space. But even restricting the
discussion to non-relativistic quantum mechanics, the fact that a mathematical object
is defined on a high dimensional mathematical space does not entail that the objects it
represents live in a high dimensional physical space.
Peter Lewis (2004) proposes an argument to the effect that the many dimensions
of configuration space refer to the few dimensions of ordinary space (pace Monton
(2006)). The argument rests on the observation that certain coordinate transformations
leave dynamical laws invariant, and not others, and that the ones which do correspond
to transformations of a three dimensional space. A similar and perhaps more general
argument can be based on the fact that in quantum mechanics, particles of the same kind
are believed to be indiscernible, which translates into the assumption that exchanging
two coordinate variables changes the wave-function by only a plus or minus sign:
Ψ(...xi...xj ...) = ±Ψ(...xj ...xi...)
The xi in this formula correspond to three dimensional position vectors. The as-
sumption means that the probabilities calculated from the wave-function of a composite
system should be invariant under a permutation of the (ordinary) space-coordinates of
each identical particle. Wave-functions which do not respect this constraints are con-
sidered unphysical.
If particles do not exist, but only the wave-function, an interpretation in terms of
indistinguishability of particles is no more available, yet the assumption in its mathe-
matical form remains valid.
At this point there are two possible approaches. Either one assumes that the ‘real’
space is the configuration space, and that this constraint on acceptable physical states
is a brute fact about nature. Perhaps this brute fact would help us explain why physical
space seems to have 3 dimensions, when it actually has 3N . However Lewis’ argu-
ment can be transposed to this case: it would force us to assume that not all coordinate
transformations of the configuration space are on a par. Certain transformations (those
which do not correspond to transformations of the coordinates of ordinary space) would
change a physical wave-function into an unphysical wave-function. This is not accept-
able from a scientific point of view, where coordinate choices in a physical space are
generally considered arbitrary. Typically, a coordinate transformation can correspond
to the same system observed from a different perspective. Then permutation invariance
would entail that some perspectives in (3N dimensional) physical space are forbidden
by the theory, which doesn’t seem to make much sense.
The second and less contentious option is to assume that physical space actually
has 3 dimensions, and that different mathematical dimensions of the configuration
space are actually referring to the same physical dimensions, which partly explains
the constraint on possible states and preserves the arbitrariness of coordinate choices
in such a way that any coordinate transformation in ordinary space changes a physical
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wave-function into another physical wave-function.
If this is the case then no additional structure is needed to interpret the wave-
function as an object in ordinary space, since the physical dimensions on which the
wave-function is defined are the 3 dimensions of ordinary space. All we need is to
interpret the structure that is already there, and in particular, the configuration-space
points.
Let us assume just this. This will be our starting point for developing an ontology
in ordinary space-time from the structure of the wave-function alone.
2.2 Interpreting the wave-function
If physical space has three dimensions, then a configuration-space point is an ordered
set (or N-tuples) of N space-time points (just as in figure 3 above, each configuration-
space point is a couple of one-dimensional space points) and the wave-function assigns
properties to these sets of space-time points. So far, we have what Belot (2012) calls a
multi-field. (Note that the statistical features of quantum mechanics mentioned above,
concerning particles indistinguishability, can help us simplify the picture and assume
that, at least in the case of fermions of the same kind, configurations can be represented
by simple, unordered sets of space-time points. See appendix A.)
The position I will defend is that configuration-space points directly represent the
fundamental constituents of reality. Let us call these fundamental constituents ‘config-
urations’ for simplicity, although one should bear in mind that they are not configura-
tions of anything, but fundamental objects.
What could be the ontological interpretation of a N-tuple (or a set) of space-time
points?
Each configuration could represent a complete classical state of the world where
N particles have well-defined positions, each point in the set representing one of these
positions1. However one should resist this interpretation: that would require particles
at the fundamental level, and that would contradict the idea that configurations are
fundamental. The idea is to conceive of configurations as primitive objects.
The alternative I propose is to view configurations as primitive, concrete N-ary re-
lations between space-time points. This proposal can be seen as an elaboration of ontic
structural realism (Ladyman 1998), or the view that the fundamental constituents of re-
ality are primitive relations which do not supervene on their relata. Configurations do
not indeed supervene on space-time because they have their own dynamical properties,
the complex-valued coefficient (a weight and a phase) that the wave-function assigns
to them, and therefore they do not reduce to the structure of space-time alone.
These primitive relations are represented mathematically by sets of space-time
points. Following this view, the configuration space should not be interpreted as a
1That would correspond to Sebens (2015)’s proposal to construe quantum mechanics as describing many
interacting classical worlds.
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physical space, but as a mere mathematical tool encoding the structure of spatial rela-
tions between different configurations. Two configurations are close in configuration
space when they are similar, in that the points they relate are, two by two, in the same
neighbourhoods.
Note that the weight of a configuration should be interpreted as a coefficient of
existence of some sort (a degree of ‘something being there’), otherwise the link with
observations would be broken. State attribution to the world (hence knowledge) would
be impossible: some states of the world more probably exist than others, in particular
the ones which contain the wave-functions or state matrix we attribute to the systems
we prepare and measure. This ‘coefficient of existence’ could be interpreted as a dis-
position to manifest in the world (which would fit with the view defended by Ladyman
that the primitive relations are modal). What this ‘manifestation’ amounts to (and
whether it is objective or not) will depend on the interpretation. I will leave aside these
interpretational issues here.
In any case, attributing ‘coefficients of existence’ to configurations does not amount
to attributing matter density to regions of ordinary space-time (and the proposal does
not reduce to GRWm). There is more structure to it. It amounts to applying a density
function to configuration space, but as just said, the configuration space should be
viewed as a mere mathematical tool describing the relational structure of configurations
in ordinary space, while configurations are the only fundamental constituents of reality.
Moreover there is a one-to-many relation between density functions on configuration
space and density functions on ordinary space. Density functions on ordinary space
are less informative. In that sense, a matter density field on ordinary space would be
derivative rather than primitive.
The Schrödinger equation describes the evolution of these complex-valued coeffi-
cients with time. One of its salient aspects is that it is local-deterministic, which means,
loosely speaking, that the evolution of the coefficient of a configuration is influenced
by other configurations and their coefficients only when all their points are in the same
neighbourhoods. In other terms, configurations interact together when they are closely
related in configuration space, which translates in their relating closely related points
in physical space.
Thus we have an interpretation of the wave-function as attributing properties to ob-
jects living in a 3 dimensional space, the configurations, which demonstrates that we
need not complement quantum mechanics with additional mathematical structures to
obtain an ontology in ordinary space-time. However, in order to show that this interpre-
tation is successful, one needs to show that the manifest image of the world, consisting
in our familiar, localised objects with determinate properties, can be recovered from
this picture. Only two more ingredients are needed for this task, and they are fully part
of standard quantum mechanics.
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2.3 Recovering familiar objects
In the remaining of this section, I will explain how one can recover familiar objects
from an ontology of configurations. My purpose is not to provide a rigorous account,
rather to give the reader an intuitive grasp of how it can be done. I hope this will suffice
to convince that an alternative exists to primitive ontologies.
Our first ingredient to recover familiar objects is decoherence. If the decoherence
program is sound, then one can imagine that configurations eventually form separate
branches, i.e. clusters of configurations with high coefficients which no more interact
significantly with configurations located outside their own cluster (because the actions
of these external configurations cancel each other out), yet still interact with each other
inside their own cluster. Further, all the configurations in a given branch will dis-
play similarities in terms of the location of the space-time points they relate: a branch
corresponds, roughly, to a dynamically stable set of macroscopically indiscernible con-
figurations with high coefficients (see figure 4 for an illustration)2.
Figure 4: Illustration of a cluster of configurations
In collapse theories such as GRW and CSL, stochastic processes might smooth out
some branches at a rate sufficiently high to remove all but a single branch at any time
(this branch will then divide into new stable branches, but they will be smoothed out
in turn by future processes). Then the wave-function would represent a single evolv-
ing branch, or cluster of macroscopically indiscernible configurations. Having such
processes is not obviously required (what exactly is the trouble with having several
non-interacting branches in the world?) but it can help recover the link between con-
figuration coefficients and empirical probabilities, through an appropriate dynamic.
The second ingredient we need to recover familiar objects is the separability of a
cluster of configurations into localised objects. Here we can simply follow the physi-
cists, who have a well-defined notion of separability (or lack of entanglement) between
different systems in terms of factorisability of the wave-function.
Separability ensures that objects will not display spooky correlations in their re-
spective evolutions. The notion can be explained intuitively as follows: imagine we di-
vide the whole physical space S in two sub-spaces S1 and S2. Then each configuration
2In traditional interpretations, decoherence results in a trade-off between the determinacy of the relative
positions of particles and the determinacy of their relative momenta, which would translate here into a trade-
off between the macroscopic ‘similarity’ of the configurations in the branch and the dynamical stability of
the branch.
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of N space-time points can be described as a combination of two sub-configurations,
one of P points in S1 and the other of Q points in S2, where P + Q = N . If the
configurations are similar enough, P and Q will be the same for all configurations
in the branch. The wave-function can be viewed as attributing coefficients to pairs
of sub-configurations instead of configurations. Now picture these coefficients as the
probabilities that each sub-configuration is paired with the other, and imagine we find
no specific correlation: a sub-configuration in S1 has the same probability of being
paired with any sub-configuration of S2 than any other. In such a case, we might view
our whole branch as the combination of two independent ‘regional branches’ living in
sub-spaces S1 and S2, each with its own dynamical evolution. The separability condi-
tion ensures that these regional branches will evolve autonomously, at least in a short
time range.
We can continue this decomposition process recursively until the separability con-
dition fails. The recovery of separability is not always possible. It is impossible for
entangled states, such as states in a EPR experiment. Moreover, separability is usually
approximate, and the conditions for separability are a probabilistic matter. However we
have good reasons to think that these conditions will only fail at a microscopic level.
Assuming this, a branch can be decomposed into a set of microscopic three di-
mensional objects, which are really very localised ‘regional branches’, or clusters of
small sub-configurations each relating a few space-time points in the same location (or
even a single space-time point for each), and this decomposition will be relatively ro-
bust in time (figure 5). There is a sense in which mereology is recovered: big clusters
(and branches) can be seen as composed of smaller, regionalised sub-clusters, and the
properties of the big cluster approximately supervene on the properties and arrange-
ment of its parts. These small sub-clusters will look like atomic, autonomous classical
objects. More importantly, as we saw that the law of evolution is local-deterministic
and in virtue of separability, configurations will interact together just as if these atomic
objects were directly interacting (i.e. objects will influence other objects nearby, inde-
pendently of objects far apart). Thus the manifest image of the world can be recovered.
Figure 5: Illustration of a separable cluster of configurations
To summarise, we have one fundamental level and two levels of emergence in this
picture:
1. At the fundamental level, configurations are concrete relations between space-
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time points.
2. Branches emerge from decoherence; they are dynamically robust sets of macro-
scopically indiscernible configurations.
3. Our familiar localised objects and their constituents emerge from separability;
they are stable sets of regional sub-configurations.
Note that the emergence of objects from configurations is top-down rather than
bottom-up: parts emerge from the whole. The reason for this is that configurations are
holistic objects. As we will see below, this holism is the main characteristic difference
between this interpretation and other primitive ontology accounts.
3 Virtues and possible objections
As already noted this presentation does not pretend to be perfectly rigorous. For ex-
ample, it should be noted that a certain notion of separability of systems from their
environment (in terms of interaction hamiltonian) is a pre-condition of decoherence,
and things are probably a little more entangled and complicated: the question of sepa-
rability in quantum mechanics is still an active area of research (For more on this topic,
see Dugic´ & Jeknic´ 2006, Jeknic-Dugic et al. 2013).
However we can leave out the details. Assuming that we can make sense of deco-
herence and separability in physics, it seems that there is no real obstacle in interpreting
the wave function as a structure living in a low-dimensional space-time, from which
familiar objects can be recovered. This might not be a complete, true picture of the
world (not as far as quantum field theory is concerned), but if it is coherent, then the
motivations for a primitive ontology in terms of local beables in complement to the
wave-function are unfounded.
One virtue of this proposal, shared by wave-function realism, is its parsimony. One
doesn’t need to add new structures to the theory for metaphysical reasons, pointing at
them as ‘what really, primitively exists’. All the needed structures are already present
in the formalism: they are the configuration space points.
Incidentally, we face no specific problem in combining these structures with special
relativity. The view presented here can be easily extended to Fock spaces by assuming
that configurations do not all relate the same fixed number of space-time points, which
can account for particle creation and annihilation, and which is a first step toward a
relativistic version of this interpretation3.
Another virtue of the present interpretation is that the status of the wave-function is
clear. As noted before, the primitive ontology program faces some difficulties concern-
ing the status of the wave-function. It is generally assumed that it must be relegated to
3Although there might be complications for separability conditions and the identification of objects, in
relation to the well known interpretational difficulties of quantum field theory (Earman & Fraser 2006).
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the status of a nomic entity, but its exact ontological status remains to be clarified (see
section 1).
In the alternative proposed here, the wave-function is not a nomic entity: it assigns
properties to objects in ordinary space-time, the configurations. Furthermore, the fun-
damental objects of ontology are not surplus structure which play no predictive role,
since their mathematical counterparts are part of the standard formalism, contrarily
to other primitive ontology proposals. The way dispositions can be assigned to local
objects, through separability, is also made clear.
These virtues of parsimony and clarity of the status of the wave-function are shared
by wave-function realism, but the present interpretation does not face the difficulties
of wave-function realism in accounting for the correspondence between the theory and
ordinary space-time. For example, no ad-hoc assumption concerning the way the 3N
dimensions of configuration space are mapped to the 3 dimensions of ordinary space
is required, since the configuration space is a mere mathematical tool constructed from
ordinary space-time, just as in classical physics. Thus we take the advantages of both
primitive ontologies and wave-function realism, without the drawbacks.
Let us briefly review some possible objections to this proposal.
A first caveat is that I had to appeal to the notion of probability in my explanation
of separability (interpreting coefficients as a probability measure). The association be-
tween probabilities and the coefficients is not obvious, but this is an independent issue,
which is related to the measurement problem. Furthermore, the narrative proposed here
was meant to give an intuitive grasp of what separability amounts to, but this narrative
needs not be taken too seriously. The important point is that separated objects can be
assigned a relatively autonomous dynamic. Different interpretations might then be en-
visaged. Even if this aspect were a problem, one can accept that the coefficients do
indeed correspond to dispositional properties, associated with a probabilistic dynamic.
A second worry could concern the use of emergence. What kind of reduction is
involved in talks of branches and ‘regional branches’ of ‘sub-configurations’? (a func-
tional reduction perhaps?) Should we be eliminativist with regards to ordinary objects
and say they are illusory? I have no strong opinion on this subject, but it doesn’t seem
absurd to me to say that when we talk about ordinary objects, we are really talking
about stable, local similarities between the instantiated configurations of the universe.
Talk of ordinary objects is full of identity paradoxes, which the loose notions of simi-
larity and stability might help circumvent.
Another possible objection is that I did not really do away with a primitive on-
tology, because I assumed space-time points. Indeed the present interpretation is not
entirely neutral with regards to the metaphysics of space-time. Under a relational con-
strual, i.e. if space-time only describes spatiotemporal relations between objects, we
would have to assume that space-time describes spatiotemporal relations between con-
figurations, which are themselves relations between space-time points. Perhaps there
is a way to make sense of it (for example by assuming that configurations are simple
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objects but have many spatiotemporal relations to every other configurations instead of
one), but such an account seems prima-facie circular4. However the interpretation is at
least compatible with a substantialist metaphysics of space-time, or with a structuralist
construal, according to which space-time points are identified by their positions in the
relational structure of space-time only.
Finally I think that the present interpretation comes close to the way the formalism
is naturally interpreted in practice. Experimentalists implicitly assume that the many
dimensions of configuration space refer to the three spatial dimensions of our physical
space. This assumption is involved for example when they calculate a detection prob-
ability in a particular position in space from the wave-function of a composite system,
or when a wave-function is assigned to a composite system in a prepared initial state. It
is also implicitly involved in the indistinguishability postulate, and perhaps also in the
dynamical laws when they display symmetries corresponding to coordinate transfor-
mation in ordinary space-time. However experimentalists need not assume that there
are objects beyond the wave-function to derive their predictions.
4 Conclusion: a prejudice against holism?
Wave-function realists and primitive ontologies both assume that taking the wave-
function ontologically seriously implies that the configuration space must be our fun-
damental physical space. The former are willing to bite the bullet, while the latter
think this is a problem and attempt to complement the wave-function with a primitive
ontology in ordinary space-time and relegate the wave-function to the status of a nomic
entity.
I think this shared assumption is unwarranted: first, it is doubtful that the configu-
ration space is primitive, rather than derivative, and second, it is perfectly possible to
interpret the wave-function as representing objects in ordinary space-time. In this pa-
per, I attempted to develop such an interpretation by taking the points of configuration-
space to represent the fundamental constituents of the world. There might exist other
possibilities, but suffice to say that this account succeeds to show that the motivations
of primitive ontology proponents are unfounded. Interpreting the wave-function as
representing objects in ordinary space-time allows one to take the advantages of wave-
function realism (parsimony and a clear ontological status for the wave-function) and
that of primitive ontologies (an explicit correspondence to ordinary space-time objects)
without facing the respective difficulties of both positions.
The account proposed here share some similarities with primitive ontologies: it
also attempts to make clear the link between the ontology of quantum mechanics and
the manifest image of the world, by taking seriously our ordinary space-time. The
main difference with other primitive ontology proposals such as flashes, particles and
matter density fields is that the fundamental objects of our ontology are not local, but
4I am grateful to Matthias Egg for raising this point.
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relational. We have to accept a form of relational holism, the view that relations do not
supervene on the intrinsic properties of their relata, and the view that ordinary objects
supervene on relational aspects rather than the converse.
The assumption that an ontology should assign properties to local objects is shared
by wave-function realists and primitive ontologists altogether: both camps are willing
to interpret the wave-function as attributing properties to points in a physical space
(be it our ordinary space or not). This is true at least following the prescriptions of
some authors who put emphasis on the term ‘local beable’. This amounts to denying
that entanglement, which is a central feature of quantum mechanics, is a fundamental
aspect of reality: entanglement between particles would not mean that physical systems
are themselves non local, but could be reduced to nomic aspects, or explained away by
the fact that we do not actually live in a 3 dimensional space.
From this assumption that ‘what exists’ must be local (which probably has its roots
in common sense intuitions) stem all the difficulties, including the remarkable fact that
the dispositionalist cannot avoid a form of holism, with dispositions being assigned to
configurations of local-beables rather than to the primitive ontology directly 5.
Why not, then, reject this assumption of locality and accept the main tenet of ontic
structural realism that relations be primitive objects? The position is known to have
other virtues, after all.
A Appendix
Permutation invariance can be formulated as follows:
Ψ(...xi...xj ...) = ±Ψ(...xj ...xi...)
It can be shown from the formula above that the value of the field at any position
in configuration space uniquely specifies the value at a position which corresponds to
a different ordering of the space-time points.
In the anti-symmetric case Ψ(...xi...xj) = −Ψ(...xj ...xi) which corresponds to
fermions, the wave function will assign a zero value in case two space coordinates
have the same value (xi = xj).
It follows that assigning a complex value to every (unordered) set of (distinct)
space-time points uniquely determines the wave-function of fermions of the same kind,
and that the wave-function for fermions can be made equivalent to a field on sets of
space-time points. This might not be the most useful description for the purpose of the
physicist, but it captures the fact that we do not really need particles in our ontology,
only space-time points (where the ordering and repeatability could have left a doubt).
5Esfeld (2015) argues that primitive ontologies can be reconciled with structuralist, holistic accounts by
assuming that primitive objects are identified by their positions in a relational structure. However there is
a difference between assuming that laws and structures of objects are holistic, and assuming that primitive
objects are themselves non-local entities, and it is the latter assumption that makes all the difference.
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Note that this picture can easily be extended to Fock spaces, if the number of space-
time points in configurations is indeterminate: wave-functions are then fields on the
power set of space-time points.
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